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In this paper I retest the assertion that party identification is multidimensional by using the 
2000 American National Election Survey.  Variables relevant to partisanship are used to 
examine how voters connect their evaluations of the two parties.  The findings support the 
theory of multidimensionality. The data show that the multidimensional conceptualization 




 Party Identification has an important central role in studies of American politics. 
One reason for this is the role that partisanship plays in affecting citizens political 
behavior, in particular ones voting decisions.  Because of the stability of citizens party 
identification, it has remained a vital concept in studies of electoral politics and 
partisanship.  From its origins in The American Voter, the definition of partisan 
identification has remained that of a psychological tie to one party or the other, and this 
tie is of central importance in shaping both their attitudes and behavior (Campbell et al., 
1960: 121).   
Stemming from the Michigan researchers and The American Voter, party 
identification is conceptualized to be on a unidimensional scale, with Republicans on one 
end, Democrats on the other, and Independents placed directly in the center of the two 
opposing sides.   In recent decades there has been much research done on the way party 
identification is conceptualized, particularly whether or not this unidimensional scale 
actually accounts for attachments, or lack of, for all citizens, as well as their attitudes 
toward the other party.  The traditional measure of party identification indicates that 
independents, who are seen as holding a position between the two opposing parties, would 
be a middle, or neutral choice.  Recent literature, however, has found evidence that 
independence is not simply the neutral choice between the two extremes.  Those 
identifying themselves as independents can vary greatly in their personal attitudes toward 
the parties and their perceived attachments.  People can identify themselves as being a pure 
independent and having no real attachment to either party, while others could also identify 
themselves as such, but in reality be quite partisan.   
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This is just an example of issues that make measurement of party identification with a 
unidimensional scale problematic. 
 This unidimensional scale of partisanship does not account for attitudes toward 
other parties, parties in general, or the true nature of independence.   For this reason there 
have been more updated conceptualizations in recent literature of party identification, some 
of which place partisanship on two dimensions as well as multidimensional scales (Katz, 
1979;Weisberg, 1980).  A two dimensional scale of party identification is not a linear line 
with the two ends being opposing sides, but is more U shaped.  This would mean that in 
some cases the opposite extremes are at times more alike in their partisan attitudes than 
they are like the Independents closer to them (Katz, 1979: 150).   
 A multidimensional view is more complex.  From this perspective, partisanship of 
strong and weak partisans, pure independents, and independent leaners can all be placed on 
a scale true to actual preferences in relation to the other partisan categories.  This view 
makes it possible to examine in one dimension the partisan identifications of Republicans, 
Democrats in another, and independents in another.  From this multidimensional 
perspective, Republicans and Democrats do not have to be considered as having opposing 
identifications, and independents are not simply the neutral choice, but measured and 
placed on a dimensional scale closest to where their attitudes toward parties and 
independence place them in relation to the other categories of identification.  This 
multidimensional view also allows for the possibility that a person can have more than one 
identification, or at least have positive views of seemingly opposing groups. 
 The level of polarization between the two parties has particular relevance here.  
Depending on the actual level of polarization of the political parties, this could effect the 
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assumptions made about the multidimensionality of party identification.  If the two 
political parties are found to be more polarized now as opposed to 25 years ago, this could 
suggest that party identification has become less multidimensional and more 
unidimensional, since the views of strong identifiers would be better suited placed along a 
linear line at opposing ends.  From Keith Pooles data of party polarization in Congress, 
one can examine whether or not the parties in government have in fact become more 
polarized since 1980.  These data show the DW-NOMINATE mean scores of party 
polarization overall from 1979-2004 and the polarization levels of the two parties 
developed from roll call voting of members of Congress over time. 
 In this thesis I retest the assertion that party identification is multidimensional 
(Weisberg, 1980).  The traditional unidimensional scale of party identification is still quite 
useful for some purposes.  For this reason, I discuss it along with the two dimensional 
conceptualizations to illustrate how a multidimensional conceptualization is better for 
understanding the attitudes and behavior of partisans.  In order to explore these issues, I 
use survey data from the American National Election Studies from 2000.  Hence, in this 
study I replicate the work of Weisberg (1980), but due to the limitations of the newer 
surveys, the dimensionality of independence can not be fully explored to the extent that it 
was done previously.  What will be fully explored is how voters connect their evaluations 
of the two parties.  





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theory of Party Identification 
 The theory of party identification as it is used here was originally discussed in 
terms of group theory by Campbell et al. in The Voter Decides.  Here the authors think of 
party attachment as an important factor that acts as a psychological force in determining 
political behavior.  The authors think of party identification as one similar to any other 
group that would produce standard-setting behaviors: 
In other words, it is assumed that many people associate themselves 
psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this 
identification has predictable relationships with their perceptions, 
evaluations, and actions...We would expect high party identification to be 
associated with conformity to perceived party standards and support of 
perceived party goals. (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954, pg.90.) 
 
 Taking up this same idea in a later work, the authors of The American Voter discuss 
political parties as having for some people either attracting or repelling qualities, and it is 
from this that they define identification.  From these attracting or repelling qualities of 
political parties, an individual may develop an identification, positive or negative, of 
some degree of intensity(Campbell, et al., 1960: 121-122).  This definition itself indicates 
that individuals will differ in their levels of identification.  Some will strongly identify with 
the group or political party while others will identify with a political party in a negative 
way.  
Proposing a new view of party identification, Weisberg (1980) addresses the notion 
of group attachment and its treatment, claiming that it constrains the interpretation of party 




 (1) It assumes that citizens can identify with only a single party, rather than 
examining more fully their attitudes toward both parties, (2) it assumes that 
political independence is just the opposite of partisanship, and (3) it assumes the 
importance of parties, rather than exploring the persons identification with the 
party system. (Weisberg,1980: 35). 
  
 Further, in a multidimensional space there are three different components of party 
identification. Those are (1) intensity with which someone likes their own party, (2) the 
degree they like their own party more than the other, or their extremity, and (3) their 
attitudes toward independence (p.49).  Under the traditional unidimensional view of party 
identification, all of these different aspects of political identification are inseparable.  The 
theory proposed is that people can have multiple identifications, and that the tradition 
theory and measures of party identification do not make allowances for this possibility.   
Dimensionality of Party Identification 
 Previous literature has taken issue with and raised legitimate questions about 
specific methods and timing of surveying attitudes of partisanship (Borelli et al., 1987; 
Stranga and Sheffield, 1987; Kenney and Rice,1988; and Green and Palmquist, 1990). 
These authors works point to improvements in collection of data on attitudes of party 
identification. Their contributions to the literature, though, do not enhance understanding 
of possible multiple dimensions of party identifications. John Petrocik (1974) challenges 
the idea that the traditional party identification scale actually represented one dimension, 
suggesting that there are other factors or variables that could generate intransitivities in 
the index (Petrocik, 1974).  His research sets out to demonstrate the extent to which this 
index of party identification distorts an analysis of political involvement. 
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What he finds is that typical conclusions about the behaviors of independents and partisans 
are not correct, particularly in the case of leaning independents and weak partisans.What is 
interesting is that leaning independents are higher on some types of political involvement 
than weak identifiers.  These leaners are less likely to identify and vote a straight ticket, but 
they are higher in political involvement than weak identifiers.  The important point is that 
factors other than partisanship play a role in behavior and attitudes, and these create the 
intransitivities to which Petrocik refers.  This means that the categories of strength of 
partisanship are out of order - - not related monotonically in an ordered system consisting 
of sets where each set is contained in the previous set. Petrocik finds that the most 
important factors affecting the likelihood of being an independent leaner or a weak partisan 
are education, income, race, and region - with education and income making up much of 
the variance in the probability of being a leaner.  Leaners participate in election campaigns 
at a higher rate than weak identifiers because leaners are more educated and therefore some 
have higher incomes and enjoy advantages over weak identifiers that are relevant to 
involvement.  The conclusion is that partisanship does promote involvement, but education 
and income are also influential.  Petrocik says that because the partisanship index was 
developed to predict voting and party attitudes but has since been applied to predict many 
other things such as political involvement, it should be determined how appropriate it is.  It 
was found that the index of party identification is not monotonic with regard to all kinds 
of political involvement(p.40).  This is called a distortion in the relationship between 
partisanship and political involvement, suggesting that alternative ways of measuring 
partisanship be used that do not include these intransitivities.   
  
 7
 Following Petrocik, more research has found that conventional spatial models of 
party identification cannot explain all phenomena (Katz, 1979).  In reference to research in 
favor of the unidimensional model, Katz says that while these findings suggest a 
dimension on which strong partisans of differing parties must be placed in close proximity, 
measures of issue opinions suggest that they ought to be placed far apart. Obviously this is 
an impossibility in a unidimensional space (p.150).  The point is that opposite extremes of 
the scales are more alike than those in the center in terms of activity and turnout, for 
example.  Using the 1956, 1958, and 1960 National Election Panel Study, he found that if 
a strong partisan switched parties from election to election they were more likely to be 
strong identifiers with the new party, rather than independents or weak identifiers.  Katz 
says that if strong partisanship represents the need to identify with a party, there is no 
reason to think that this need would be modified by change of preference (p.158).  In 
other words, they are unlikely to convert, but if it happens they become equally strong in 
identification with the new party.  This conclusion suggests that intensity is distinct from 
preference, and that the currently used scales of party identification combine two separate 
dimensions, strength and direction, and for some purposes understanding would be 
furthered if those dimensions were separated.   
 Weisberg (1980) argues that it is possible for citizens to have multiple 
identifications and that independence is not just the opposite of partisanship, but can also 
be a positive identification.  Using factor analysis of indicators of party identification from 
the 1980 CPS National Election Study, Weisberg finds that there were four separate 
dimensions to party identification.  These were an independent factor, a partisan direction 
factor, a strength of partisanship factor, and a party system factor.  By measuring these 
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concepts separately Weisberg finds that partisans do not seem to view independents as 
being in the middle of a partisanship dimension, which would mean that independence is 
more than a dislike of parties.  Additionally, feeling thermometers indicate that some 
partisans dislike independents and some independents dislike partisans, and some citizens 
like both partisans and independents, while others dislike both.  Weisberg interprets this to 
mean that the public sees political independence as more complex than the absence of 
identification with a party.  Other measures found that a fifth of strong party supporters 
also think of themselves as independents, and almost half of the pure independents do 
not consider themselves either party supporters or independents.  Weisberg takes this to 
mean that standard party identification questions do not give them opportunity to describe 
their position.   Generally, the conclusion is that an exploration of partisanship would have 
to include attitudes toward separate parties, the possibility of multiple identifications, 
meanings of nonidentification, and attitudes toward the party system as a whole to fully 
explain the relationships across the different dimensions.  
 In a later work (1983) Weisberg tests particular dimensions of party identification 
with new scales developed from new survey questions added to the 1982 National Election 
Study.  From this a new five point scale of closeness was developed that ranges from: 
Republican supporters, nonsupporters closest to the Republican party, those not closer to 
either, nonsupporters closer the Democratic party, and Democratic supporters.  This new 
scale is found to work better than the standard seven-point scale.  He says that its utility is 
to test relationships with other variables, testing  continuity over time, as well as 
relationship with relevant political behavior.  The new scale reports fewer partisans than 
the original and over time it performs as well as the traditional party identification scale.  
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Strong partisans remain so, and fairly predictably, while weak partisans are found to be 
about as equally likely to be nonindependent party supporters, closer to a party or not, but 
less likely to be independent (1983: 373).  This is said to be possibly because people 
cannot identify with the identification questions, and are actually none of the above.  The 
weak partisan category includes many nonidentifiers who pull down the overall 
involvement level for weak identifiers.  By combining the no partisan preference with 
independent, understanding of independence gets confused, and there needs to be a 
distinction between the two.  This 1983 subset also includes a new question of 
independence, which Weisberg says can be combined with support/closeness scales to 
make a ten category classification.  What he found, though, was that independence is a 
separate matter from support/closeness - it can be useful to combine, but he generally does 
not recommend it.   
  Knight (1987) tests Weisbergs findings, specifically of citizen ideological 
sophistication and whether or not correlations are found because of a positivity bias.  
Knight suggests that Weisbergs findings of correlations of the feeling thermometers are 
due to differences in conceptualization levels: ideologues, group benefit respondents -- 
those who judge parties in terms of perceived benefits, nature of the times respondents, 
and no issue content respondents.  The first two are regarded as the top levels of 
sophistication, and the last are the lowest.  This, Knight says, is partially responsible for 
Weisbergs findings -- that negative correlations in the two higher conceptualization levels 
are offset by positive correlations in the two lower levels.  The reason?  There tends to be a 
positivity bias in feeling thermometer responses: Citizens will be somewhat more 
positively disposed toward groups they like, or with whom they identify, than they will be 
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negatively disposed toward groups that they do not feel attracted to (1987: 319).  The 
differences in positive and negative evaluations affect the strength of the raw negative 
correlations between the group assumed to represent polar opposites, --  controlling for 
positivity should correct this. (1987: 320).  She then subtracted individuals average 
evaluation of all groups from the actual feeling thermometer rating, -- then reports that 
there are now correlations between all levels of conceptualization.  This method is said to 
correct the positivity bias.  Knight concludes that the traditional index of partisanship 
should be reconceptualized, and recommends excluding independents and nonpartisans 
from the measurement of partisanship.   
 Kamieniecki later analyzed the dimensionality of partisanship and the relationship 
between two of the separate levels, strength and independence, by examining the 
relationships between measures of both factors and other relevant variables.  Using data 
drawn from the 1980 and 1984 NES/CPS surveys, he finds that 1) independents exhibit 
greater affinity for their group than disdain for parties, 2) greater partisan strength tends to 
be accompanied with equal support for parties and opposition to independence, 3) 
increased independence is related to inconsistent partisan activity, and 4) strength of 
independence is more a positive attraction to independence than a rejection of parties.  
These findings challenge the belief that partisan strength and independence are of the same 
dimension of party identification - they are two separate dimensions.  
Classification of Independents 
 Early studies of party identification treated independents generally as people who 
lack an affiliation or positive identification with one of the two major parties (Campbell et 
al, 1960).  Since then there have been revisions of how independents are treated in 
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research, delving further into what attitudes these independent citizens hold exactly and 
what independence means to them.  Growing levels of independents beginning in the 
1960s further fueled research, with studies focusing specifically on the concept of 
independence to clarify the concept and how it relates to electoral politics and voting 
behavior. 
 Miller and Wattenberg (1983) is one example of research into independence and 
partisanship.  Their study challenges others who have reported a decline in overall 
partisanship.  Miller and Wattenberg argue that no preference responders have been 
incorrectly combined with independents, primarily because the two are not mutually 
exclusive.  Apoliticals are distinct from independents in their level of participation; there 
has not been a growth in apoliticals, but a decline in the importance of political parties 
generally.  This is important because of a rise in the type of nonpartisan that has not been 
distinguished in the party identification scale -- someone who is somewhat aware of 
political matters but lacks responsiveness to the concepts of either partisanship or 
independence (1983: 108).  Further, there are five types of nonpartisans: those who are 
unquestionably apolitical, two groups that are not apolitical but that express no preference, 
one group that leans toward neither party, and a final group that indicates a partisan 
leaning.  Miller and Wattenberg test how independents and no preference survey 
respondents evaluate the job that political parties are doing.  What they find is that no 
preference respondents are less likely to think that parties are doing a good job, and that 
they are more likely to split their ballot and support the saliency of candidates over parties.  
Miller and Wattenberg conclude that these respondents are not necessarily dissatisfied with 
parties, but are unaware of or ambivalent about the role that they play in the political 
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process.  Independents, on the other hand, may be largely dissatisfied with parties, but may 
nevertheless feel they perform a useful function (119).  This shows that independents are 
not all the same, and that survey respondents with very different attitudes toward parties 
should not be put into the same category.  Further, the results clearly show that 
independents are not just people who are median responders who are neutral in their 
identification with parties.   
  Craig responds to Miller and Wattenbergs study, saying that no preference 
nonpartisans and independents are different in some respects, but that these differences are 
not so much to do with how they view political parties, but of how they view the symbol of 
partisan independence.  Using data from the 1976 and 1980 CPS national election studies, 
Craig finds that respondents in each of the nonpartisan categories tend to differ from 
strong and weak identifiers in that they are more strongly anti-party.  No preference non 
partisans possess different orientations toward independence, but not toward parties, than 
do self named independents.  Craig finds support for combining no preference nonpartisans 
with independents on the seven-point party identification scale (281).  He concludes that 
independents and no preference non-partisans are not all that different.  Saliency is lower 
among independents and no preference non-partisans, though there was a decline in 
saliency and dissatisfaction with all categories.  Finally, Craig questions whether or not the 
seven-point scale is able to distinguish between attitudes toward the parties and attitudes 
toward independence.   
 So there are differences in the nature of nonpartisan independents.  But there are 
also those self-proclaimed independents who are not so independent in their actual political 
behavior.  These people are called leaners.  Keith et al. (1986) examine the behavior of 
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this group of independents.  When independents and leaners were analyzed separately, it 
was shown that they were very different in most forms of political behavior (158).  Leaners 
are more loyal to a party than are weak partisans in voting, but not necessarily in other 
behaviors.  If leaners are people who refuse to choose, then their evaluations should be 
neutral, but what they found are that they are not far off in feeling from weak identifiers.  It 
is possible that people might value a self-image of party loyalty, or open mindedness 
(178).  Party identification questions assume independence is simply the null or balance 
point on a scale, but partisanship and independence are not mutually exclusive.  They can 
coexist in the same person because, like partisanship, independence also has a positive 
character (180).   
Models of Partisanship 
 The traditional view of party identification is that of a single dimension with strong 
Republicans at one end, strong Democrats at the other, and political independents in the 
middle. According to this scale it would seem that Republican and Democratic 
identifications are opposites and independence is the neutral midpoint indicating total lack 
of identification.   
 Next there is a two dimensional scale of party identification similar to that 
developed by Valentine and Van Wingen (1980). This scale treats independence as a 
separate object of identification. From this dimensional interpretation, identification with 
the two parties is not necessarily in opposition to one another, and it is possible to identify 
with independence and a party at the same time or with none.   
 The final interpretation of party identification has three dimensions.  These three 
dimensions are attitude toward the Republican Party, attitude toward the Democratic Party 
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and attitude toward political independence.  Weisberg proposes a new or fourth dimension: 
attitude toward political parties in general (1980). He describes the challenge of 
introducing a new dimensional perspective of party identification: 
What is most difficult is to decide how to introduce attitudes toward political 
parties generally into this spatial presentation.  Viewing this as a fourth dimension 
allows people to like independence and the party system, as well a dislike both, and 
it allows people to like their favorite party and political parties generally, as well as 
dislike their preferred party and political parties generally.  It is probable that this 
fourth dimension would be correlated with the others: positively with attitude 
toward the Republican party and the Democratic Party, but negatively with attitude 


















QUESTIONS AND SCALES OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 In order to test the existence of multiple dimensions, survey questions are used as 
indicators of each separate dimension.  Different questions with different wording measure 
particular dimensions of party identification.  Typically the CPS surveys measure party 
identification with three questions.  The first is called a direction question: Generally 
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, 
or what?.  Respondents are asked to indicate their first choice from the three alternatives.  
There is nothing presented about the three alternatives in relation to one another, so the 
placement from this response is more general.  The second question is a leaning question 
for Independents or identifiers with other parties:  Do you think of yourself as closer to 
the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?  Asked of people who are not identifiers 
with either of the two major parties, this question taps possible partisan leanings of 
Independents, or of actual neutrality.  The third question in the party identification series is 
a strength question which is asked of people who indicated identification with the 
Republican or Democratic party on the first question: Would you call yourself a strong 
Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)?  Once identification 
with a party is established with a respondent, this question gauges just how strongly he or 
she identifies with that party, rather than merely at what end of the political spectrum are 
they placed.   
 The next question deals with political independence.  Attitudes toward 
independence can be measured by thermometer ratings of independents and a question 
tapping the strength of independence:  Do you ever think of yourself as a political 
independent or not? (If yes,) on this scale from 1 to 7 (where 1 means not very strongly, 
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and 7 means very strongly) please choose the number that describes how strongly 
independent in politics you feel.  What is missing from the new data sets is this question 
and a thermometer for political independence.  Although these items have been used in 
previous studies,  I will not be able to replicate all tests that included the independent 
variable.  
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DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 In order to replicate Wiesbergs 1980 study of multidimensionality, I use data from 
the American National Election Survey (ANES). Not all of the question variables needed 
for a full replication have been available since the 1984 ANES survey.  Specifically, these 
are the questions involving political independence and party support.  The variables that 
are included are listed below.   
 The first set of variables to be used are the feeling thermometers for the Democratic 
Party, the thermometer for the Republican Party, and the feeling thermometer for political 
parties in general.  These thermometers are on a scale from 0 to 100 with a high score 
indicating a positive attitude toward the subject, 50 being a neutral attitude, and 0 
representing negative feelings. 
 The next set of variables are measurements of party identification.  First there is the 
party identification direction question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of 
yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and independent, or what?  This question is 
measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with (1) being Democrat, (2) Republican, (3) independent, 
(4)other, and (5) No Preference. A person who answers Republican or Democrat will then 
be asked a question that is used to determine the strength and leaning of respondents party 
identification.  The strength question reads: Would you call yourself a strong Republican 
(Democrat), or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)?  This is measured as either (1) 
strong, or (2) not very strong.  A person who answers independent or No Preference is 
asked a leaning, or closeness question.  The closeness question says: Do you think of 
yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?  This is measured (1) closer to 
Republican Party (4) closer to neither, or (7) closer to the Democratic Party.   From the 
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three party identification questions one can create the seven point party identification scale 
ranging from strong, weak, and leaning Republicans, to Independents, and leaning, weak, 
and strong Democrats. 
  The first test is that of unidimensionality using responses to the party 
thermometers.  This  involves the estimation of the correlations between attitudes toward 
Republicans and toward Democrats, as measured by the feeling thermometers for the two 
parties.   If the unidimensional scale conceptualization of party identification is correct, 
these tests should show strong negative correlations between the Republicans and  
Democratic feeling thermometers.  What would be an interesting finding would be if the 
correlations were not overwhelmingly negative, indicating (as Wiesberg suggested) that 
the identification toward the two parties are not opposing views.  In addition to estimating 
the correlations for these two variables, I calculate the proportion of Republicans with 
positive, negative, and neutral views toward the Democrats, and vice versa for the 
Democrats as well.   
 The next step is to test different models and their ability to predict the vote. First I 
estimate a vote choice model using the tradititional seven-point party identification scale; 
then, in comparison, I estimate a model using  party difference.  This can be done by 
subtracting the feeling thermometer for Democrats from that of Republicans. The party 
difference is collapsed into five categories from strong Republicans (31 to 100), weak 
Republicans (1 to 30), neutrals (0), weak Democrats (-30 to -1) and strong Democrats (-
100 to -31).  There is also a seven-category version of this to take into account the large 
number of neutral respondents, adding Republican neutrals and Democratic neutrals to the 
pure neutral category. This too can be tested to find out its strength of vote predictability.  
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Next, I test three models that use: the standard party identification scale, one using the 
party difference, and one using the folded party difference variable, adding controls for 
factors such as ideology, evaluation of candidates and demographic characteristics in all 
three(race, gender, income, etc).    
 To test the standard four-point strength of identification scale, I regress this 
variable on the measures of partisan strength: intensity, as measured by the maximum of 
the thermometer ratings given to the Republican and Democratic parties, the absolute 
values of the differences in the party thermometer ratings, and a folded party closeness 
scale.  Originally, Weisberg used this to ascertain what exactly the strength of 
identification scale was actually measuring, as well as which aspect of identification was 
making up most of the variance in contributing to strength of identification. 
 The last test will be that of the dimensionality of party identification.  I estimate a 
factor analysis of the measures already used in the paper. A list of all of these variables is 
presented in the following section.  Weisberg finds four principal components in his 
analysis, making up three-quarters of the variance.  These four components were: a 
strength of partisanship factor, an independence factor, a partisan direction factor, and a 
party system factor.  From these findings he develops the multi, or four dimensional view 
of party identification. 
 In the conclusion I discuss these findings in relation to the polarization levels of the 
political parties more recently.  What could be found is that the political parties are more 
polarized than at the time of Weisbergs work, which could suggest that the 
unidimensional view of party identification has more strength than it did in 1980. If the 
political parties are no more polarized than they were 25 years ago, then I expect to find 
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similar results.  An interesting finding would be if one of the political parties becoming 
more polarized than the other, having more negative, extreme views of the other party, 
than the other party identifiers have toward them.  This would suggest the influence of 
other political factors at work, other than an overall increase in polarization between the 
two parties generally.   
  


















     RESULTS  
 An appropriate starting point to consider the multidimensionality of party 
evaluations is to examine the correlations in individuals attitudes toward the two major 
parties.  This indicates the degree to which the evaluations of the two parties are related to 
one another.  As I mentioned before, if there is multidimensionality there should be more 
of a broad range, or distribution across categories of attitudes.  However, if these party 
evaluations are multidimensional, one would expect to see high correlations between the 
evaluations of the two parties.  As one can see, the correlation between the two party 
thermometers has become more negative in the last two decades.  The correlation between 
the two party thermometers is R= -0.35.  While this correlation is more negative than in 
1980 (R= -0.17), it does not suggest that the attitudes toward the two parties have moved to 
one dimension, but it could be viewed as circumstantial evidence of greater 
unidimensionality.  What is found is evidence of at least moderate unidimensionality.   
Attitudes Toward the Opposite Party 
    The mean thermometer scores do not reveal anything surprising about how 
partisans attitudes toward each other.  Table 1 shows Republicans have high scores for the 
Republican Party, and Democrats have high scores for the Democratic Party. Strong 
Democrats evaluate the Democratic Party higher with a mean score of 83.7, than strong 
Republicans score the Republican Party with a mean score of 78.6.  When evaluating the 
other party, strong Democrats have a mean score of 36.8 for Republicans, while strong 
Republicans have a lower mean score for Democrats of 32.2. Moreover, weak and leaning 
partisans attitudes show patterns of intransitivities.  Figures 1 and 2 show these 
intransitivities.  Weak Democrats evaluate the Democratic party with a mean score of 73.4, 
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than the weak Republicans evaluate the Republican party with a score of 68.9.  Similarly, 
the leaning Democrats have a mean score of 64.3 for the Democratic party, while the 
leaning Republicans have more negative evaluations of the Republican party with a mean 
score of 61.9.  From this it looks as though the weak and leaning Republicans just evaluate 
parties, even their own, more negatively than do the weak and leaning Democrats.  
However, when looking at the weak and leaning partisans evaluations of the other party, 
this is not the case.  Leaning Republicans had lower mean scores for the Democrats than 
did the leaning Democrats of Republicans, but the weak partisans did not.  Weak 
Republicans evaluate Democrats with a mean score of 46, while the weak Democrats were 
lower with an average of 45.4.  While this is not significantly higher, it still indicates that 
weak and leaning partisans attitudes do not always align with expectations.   
 Both Republicans and Democrats have similar mean scores for parties in general.  
One thing to note about this is that neither of the two have extremely high thermometer 
scores for political parties, with scores between the mid to upper 50's.  So while the 
partisans like their own party, and have much lower opinions of the other party, they do 
not rate political parties generally much higher than independents do, scoring them roughly 
neutrally.  These evaluations form in a V-shaped distribution for parties in general. This 
can be seen in Figure 3. While the Democrats do evaluate the party system in general 
higher than Republicans (59.1 to 56.1) the categories do fit monotonically with the 
categories evaluating the party system less favorably as they move toward independence.   
 In addition to evaluating the average feelings that partisans have toward the other 
parties and the party system, calculating the positivity, neutrality, or negativity associated 
with Republicans and Democrats toward the other will enhance understanding. 
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Table 1.  Feeling Thermometer Score Evaluations for each Party value of Party 
Identification 
______________________________________________________________________________                                                       
Party Identification 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
          Democrats           Republicans Parties in General 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Strong Democrats 83.7  36.8           59.1 
   (343)  (335)           (318) 
 
Weak Democrats  73.4  45.4           53.3 
   (271)  (272)           (260) 
 
Leaning Democrats 64.3  44.7           50.8 
   (262)  (258)           (259) 
 
Pure Independents 52.1  51.1           48.1 
   (188)  (187)           (190) 
 
Leaning Republicans 43.8  61.9           50.1 
   (227)  (228)           (223) 
 
Weak Republicans 46.0  68.9           52.0 
   (204)  (207)           (206) 
 
Strong Republicans 32.2  78.6           56.1 
   (234)  (235)           (223) 
            
The number in parenthesis represents the number of cases.  Each cell represents a scale of  1-100 of feeling 
thermometer responses from positive to negative.  For instance, 83.7 percent of strong Democrats have 
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In Table 2 I show the proportions of Democrats with positive, negative, and neutral views 
toward the Republicans, and Table 3 shows the proportions of attitudes of Republicans 
toward Democrats.  What is seen is that the attitudes of Democrats with strong, neutral, 
and negative attitudes toward Republicans do not produce evidence of an overwhelmingly 
polarized political party system.  Over half of strong Democrats have negative feelings 
toward Republicans, which is to be expected.  What was not, however, was that nearly 
20% of strong Democrats had positive feelings toward Republicans, and another 20% were 
not negative, but neutral.  If the unidimensional view of party identification is correct, then 
this should not be the case.  Democrats should have very strongly negative attitudes toward 
Republicans, and only a small percentage if any should have positive feelings toward them.  
This is especially true since their attitudes toward political parties generally does not seem 
to explain this finding.     
Table 2. Democrats Attitudes Toward Republicans 
______________________________________________________________   
   Positive (%)  Negative (%)  Neutral (%)      Total  
                                                  
Strong   19.1   60.9   20.0      100 
   (64)   (204)   (67)      (335) 
 
Weak    26.8   46.7   26.1       100 
   (74)   (128)   (71)      (273) 
 
Leaning   31.8   45.7    22.5       100 
   (82)   (118)   (58)      (258) 
              
The number in parenthesis is the number of cases. 
N = 1,722                                                                                                                              
 
 As for Republicans their attitudes were slightly different.  While 60% of Democrats 
have negative feelings toward Republicans, 73% of strong Republicans have negative 
feelings toward Democrats (Table 3).  Also, only 10% of strong Republicans have positive 
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feelings toward Democrats - compared to their nearly 20%.  So it would seem that the 
Democrats have higher opinions of Republicans than Republicans have of them.  The 
Republicans dislike the Democrats more than the Democrats dislike Republicans.  There 
could be political factors involved such as them being the party out of power in the 
administration that could possibly explain this difference.  Further explanation of this is 
presented later within the discussion of party polarization levels.  
Table 3. Republican Attitudes Toward Democrats 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   Positive (%)  Negative (%)  Neutral (%)     Total 
                                                 
 
Strong   10.3   73.5   16.2      100 
   (24)   (172)   (38)      (234) 
 
Weak   28.5   48.5   22.5      100   
   (59)   (99)   (46)      (204) 
 
Leaning   24.7   45.4   29.9      100  
   (56)   (103)   (68)      (227) 
             
The number in parenthesis is the number of cases. 
N= 1,729 
 
Modeling Vote Choice  
 The next step is to test different models and their ability to predict the vote.  Three 
separate models are estimated with presidential vote being the dependent variable in all 
three.  The first model tests the ability of party identification to predict a persons 
presidential vote.  The second model tests the ability of the party difference measure to 
predict ones presidential vote, and the third tests the ability of the folded party difference 
measure to predict the vote.  The party difference measure comes from subtracting the 
feeling thermometer for Democrats from that of Republicans.  This variable represents 
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how much a respondent likes their own party more than the other.  The folded party 
difference variable is created so as to take into account the large number of neutral 
respondents, adding Republican neutrals and Democratic neutrals to the pure neutral 
category.  
 Table 4 shows the rough proportion of variance in presidential vote explained by 
each of the partisanship measures in 2000.  Just as was found in 1980, the party difference 
measures explain the vote better in terms of variance explained than the party identification 
scale, with the folded party difference scale accounting for more of the variance than the 
other two measures.     
Table 4. Proportion of Variance in Two-Party Presidential Vote Accounted for by 
Alternative Partisanship Measures, 2000. 
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Seven Point Party  







Five Category Party 







Seven Category Party 






 Table 5 shows the standard party identification scale as the independent variable 
and controls for ideology, education, income, and evaluation of the candidates.  All of 
these variables are included in order to evaluate how much weight these factors carry when 
making a vote choice for President. Also, Table 5 shows party difference variable as the 
independent variable as well as showing the folded party difference variable and the 
independent variable.  Both also have the same controls included. The model that uses the 
standard party identification scale with controls for ideology, candidate evaluations, and 
income does a good job of explaining the variance in presidential vote, with a pseudo R 
square of .865.  The more educated, the more ideologically conservative, and the higher the 
income, the more likely to vote for Bush over Gore.  These demographics performed as to 
be expected with education and income being good predictors of vote.  Education and 
income were the two variables that had the most vote predictability of those included.   
Table 5a.  Model of Presidential Vote, With Party Identification   
       Coefficient  z 
Party Identification    0.775   5.84 
Ideology     0.648   2.40** 
Education               -0.402             -2.46*** 
Income      0.088   1.30 
Bush      0.126   8.22 
Gore                -0.123             -8.07 
N 946 
R2  0.865 
 
Table 5b.  Model of Presidential Vote, With Party Difference 
 
      Coefficient  z 
Party Difference    0.940   4.63 
Ideology     0.853   3.35*** 
Education               -0.211             -1.46 
Income      0.046   0.70 
Bush      0.114   7.84 





Table 5c. Model of Presidential Vote, With Folded Party Difference 
 
      Coefficient  z 
Folded Party Difference    1.056   4.81 
Ideology     0.884   3.45*** 
Education               -0.211             -0.145 
Income      0.045   0.67 
Bush      0.116   7.96 




*** prob < .01  **prob < .05  *prob < .10 
 
 In Figure 4 I show the presidential vote, broken down for each of the seven 
partisanship categories.  When examining the vote proportions of citizens by partisanship, 
a couple of interesting findings stand out.  In particular when examined with party 
identification the presidential votes show that there are some signs of what Petrocik called 
intransitivities.  Figure shows that leaning and weak categories are not entirely consistent 
with predicted behaviors.  Republicans should vote for Republicans most of the time and 
Democrats should vote for Democrats most of the time predictably more so with an 
increasing identification.  Specifically in the case of the Republicans, the weak and leaning 
categories show similar and high proportions of vote for the Republican candidate - that 
the categories are not monotonic, or they do not exactly follow the steady upward trend on 
the scale.  The Democrats on the other hand follow the scale of weakening identification 
and lower proportions of votes for the Democratic candidate.  Democrats, those that are 



















































 In order to test what exactly strength of identification is measuring and what aspect 
of identification makes up most of the variance in strength of identification, it can be 
regressed on other measures of partisan strength.  I regressed the standard four-point 
strength of identification scale on two measures of partisan strength.  There are only two 
measures of strength included, the maximum thermometer ratings and the absolute value of 
the differences in the party thermometer ratings.  The party closeness variable is taken out 
because of problems that it causes with the number of observations. In Table 6, I report the 
results of the regression.  With just the two previously mentioned variables 31 percent of 
the variance is explained.  Both variables were statistically significant.  This means that 
both intensity (as measured by the maximum of the feeling thermometers), and how much 
they like their own party more than the other (as measured by the absolute party 
difference) are significant contributing factors in how strongly a person identifies with a 
political party.  
Factor Analysis                                                                          
 The final test of the dimensionality of partisanship is a factor analysis of several of 
the variables that have been discussed throughout the paper.  The results of this factor 
analysis are shown in Table 8.  The factor analysis reveals that there are two principal 
components and a third that has an Eigenvalue of above 1.00 but is not as strong as the first 
two.  There were eight different measures included: Democratic feeling thermometer, 
Republican feeling thermometer, parties feeling thermometer, party identification, party 
difference, absolute value of party difference, party folded, and the maximum of the 
feeling thermometers.  These three components that were found accounted for 82% of the 
variance, with the primary two making up close to 68 percent.   
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 The variables with the highest loadings on the first factor are related to partisan 
direction: party identification and party difference and the Republican and Democratic 
feeling thermometers.  The variables with the highest loadings on the second factor relate 
to strength of partisanship: the absolute value of party difference, the maximum of the 
feeling thermometers, the parties feeling thermometer, and the folded party identification 
variable.  Factor 1 is the partisan direction factor because the variables with the highest 
loadings are those that measure the direction and preference of party.  Factor 2 is the 
strength factor because both of the factors with the highest loadings measure the degree to 
which one likes their own party more than the other, and the intensity with which one likes 
their own party.    Factor 3 is the party system factor. These findings are in line with 
Weisbergs dimensions.  He found four factors - three of which I have as well - excluding 
that of independence.  From these results it would seem as though there are in fact multiple 













Table 7 - Factor Analysis 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
    (principal component factors; 3 factors retained) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
  Factor  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
 
 1  3.21405 1.01846 0.4018  0.4018 
 
 2  2.19559 1.00519 0.2744  0.6762 
 








 Variable     1              2              3              Uniqueness 
Democratic Feeling Thermometer         -0.868 0.007       0.377       0.103 
Republican Feeling Thermometer                     0.646 0.574       0.378       0.109 
Parties Feeling Thermometer        -0.189 0.504         0.646       0.293 
Partisan Identification          0.829 0.273      -0.103       0.226 
Party Difference           0.925 0.334      -0.013       0.032 
Absolute Party Difference        -0.382 0.590      -0.598       0.147 
Party Folded         -0.318 0.646      -0.338       0.367 











     DISCUSSION 
 This issue of polarization levels of the two parties would be a good place for future 
research.  The main issue tested in this paper is not polarization in particular, but it is 
related.  If there were to be a shift toward unidimensionality in voters attitudes toward the 
parties, this would happen during periods of greater party polarization.  Although there was 
not a shift toward unidimensionality found here, could there be more party polarization 
present?  Although it is not the same as examining the attitudes of the public, there are 
other indications that polarization might have occurred, or could be occurring presently.  
For instance, the data from Keith Poole shows the difference in the dimension means used 
as a measure of the level of political polarization.  What is important to note first is that 
there has been an increase in party polarization in Congress since 1980 - - in particular 
with the Republicans.  Poole notes that Congresses 100th  108th mark acceleration in 
polarization (especially in the House).  The distance between the two parties in the House 
around 1979-1980 had a mean score around 0.56 and the Senate was roughly the same.  In 
1999, the mean party difference scores had climbed to about 0.76. in the Senate, and to an 
even higher 0.82 in the House.  This shows a definite increase in party polarization.  Also 
interesting is that the party means on the liberal-conservative dimension show that while 
both parties have become more ideological, Republicans have become more conservative 
than Democrats have become more liberal since 1980.  Party unity also shows an 
interesting difference between the two parties.  Republicans vote more with their party now 
than 25 years ago and more than the Democrats do.  This was the case in both chambers of 
Congress, but more so in the House. 
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 These changes could explain why there seems to be more negative feelings about 
the Democrats from Republicans than vice versa.  The fact that in 1999 the Republicans 
were not and had not been in control of the White House also seems like a possible 
explanation for increased negativity toward the Democrats.  For future research, an 
interesting addition would be to examine these attitudes toward the other party over a long 
period of time and administrations to see if in fact there were changes in positive/negative 
attitudes with the change in party controlling Congress and the White House.  This brings 
up the issue of polarization  and whether or not the two parties have become more 
polarized over time.  From the results of this paper it would appear as though if there has 
been increased polarization, it is by the Republicans.  While polarization and 
unidimensionality are not one and the same, it could be said that in some ways they could 
be related.  If the two political parties and/or voters are highly polarized at a particular 
point in time, it might seem as though a more unidimensional view of party identification 
could be appropriate.  Though there seems to be greater levels of polarization among some 
groups, there have not been significant enough changes to say that unidimensionality is 
definitely present or will be in the near future. 
 The findings in this paper show there is more to party identification than the 
undimensional measure and scale allows.  The correlations between the attitudes of 
partisans toward their party, the opposing party, and parties in general do not give absolute 
evidence that party identification has become more unidimensional.  According to 
Weisberg (1980: 45), in order for a multidimensional scale to be a better choice alternative 
scales of partisanship would have to perform better.  What is interesting is how Democrats 
and Republicans evaluate each other.  The Republicans seem to dislike the Democrats 
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more than the Democrats dislike the Republicans.  Moreover, categories of Republicans 
are shown to vote more consistently with their own party for president than some 
Democratic categories.  This paper examines the theory of multidimensionality in the 
present.  There have been changes in attitudes of some partisan groups since 1980, but 
there are also some findings that have been shown to be consistent with the previous 
literature.  For instance, this paper shows that there has been further polarization growth 
since the 1980s, but the tests also show that alternative partisanship measures perform 
better than the standard partisan identification scale does.  Although all of the suggested 
dimensions of party identification have not been tested here, there is still support found for 
the theory.  This also gives support to examining these different aspects of party 
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LIST OF VARIABLES 
Variables: 
1. Democratic Party Thermometer 
2. Republican Party Thermometer 
3. Party Difference 
4. Absolute Value of Party Difference 
5. Maximum of Democratic and Republican Thermometers 
6. Political Parties Thermometer 
7. Traditional Party Identification 
8. Traditional Strength of partisanship 




13. Bush candidate evaluation 
14. Gore candidate evaluation 
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